Monarch: Self-expression through wearable kinetic textiles by Hartman, Kate et al.
OCAD University Open Research Repository
Faculty of Liberal Arts & Sciences
2015 
Monarch: Self-expression through wearable 
kinetic textiles
Hartman, Kate and McConnell, Jackson and Kourtoukov, Boris and Predko, Hillary 
and Colpitts-Campbell, Izzie 
Suggested citation: 
Hartman, Kate and McConnell, Jackson and Kourtoukov, Boris and Predko, Hillary and Colpitts-
Campbell, Izzie (2015) Monarch: Self-expression through wearable kinetic textiles. In: 
Proceedings of the Ninth International Conference on Tangible, Embedded, and Embodied 
Interaction. Available at http://openresearch.ocadu.ca/id/eprint/986/
Open Research is a publicly accessible, curated repository for the preservation and dissemination of 
scholarly and creative output of the OCAD University community. Material in Open Research is open 
access and made available via the consent of the author and/or rights holder on a non-exclusive basis. 
PhænEx 10 (2015): 76-99 










Against “the European Notion of Man”: 
Levinas, Freedom, and the Responsible Body 
KATHY KILOH 
 
Running throughout Emmanuel Levinas’ oeuvre is a conception of 
corporeality, embodiment, or what might be better described as “the 
experience of our bodies” (“Reflections” 7) that rejects the abstract 
separation of body and spirit marking the Western philosophical tradition. 
A conception of the adherence of the self to the body is crucial to Levinas’ 
understanding of the ethical relation between me and all the others 
because it locates both my freedom and my responsibility for the other in 
the inseparable unity of body and spirit. In fact, to speak in this way of a 
unity of two separate entities is to get it wrong, to speak in the language of 
a philosophy that misunderstands the cognitive and ethical status of the 
corporeal.   
Levinas’ early essay “Reflections on the Philosophy of Hitlerism” 
provides us with a clear description of just what it is that his conception of 
subjectivity as a lived, bodily experience rejects: “the European notion of 
man” (7). Levinas shares this position with the school of thought that he 
identifies as the philosophy of Hitlerism.1 “Reflections on the Philosophy 
of Hitlerism” is a remarkably daring—even shocking—essay in that it 
recognizes the folly of attempting to save liberal conceptions of freedom 
and dignity from a thought that takes the adherence of the self to the body 
seriously.2 Levinas certainly rejects the racist conclusions reached by the 
                                                 
1
 This point is already suggested in Asher and Gad Horowitz they point out that Levinas’ 
desire for “a definitive break with the Western tradition culminating in liberalism” is 
found in the German refusal to separate body and soul (16). This point is also noted by 
Manning 126. 
2
 Nonetheless, much of the secondary literature ignores or downplays this critique of 
liberalism. Annabel Herzog makes Levinas into an advocate of private charity within a 
liberal state and Fred C. Alford’s claim that Levinas presents an “inverted liberalism” 
assume that liberalism is, in fact sufficient—that we’ve simply taken a wrong turn 
somewhere, that what Levinas calls for is a correction to bring us back to an ethical and 
functioning liberalism for the other. This position ignores the fact that Levinas takes issue 
with the roots of liberal thought, represented by Thomas Hobbes, throughout Totality and 
Infinity, and that he levels a firm critique in “Reflections on the Philosophy of Hitlerism” 
against the foundations of liberal thought. Both Herzog’s and Alford’s account of 
Levinasian subjectivity are oddly devoid of the painful and traumatic nature of this “for 
the other” that appears in later essays and Otherwise than Being or Beyond Essence as 





philosophy of Hitlerism,3  but he also recognizes the fundamental truth 
underlying its presentation of the spirit as enchained to the body: that both 
material and spiritual needs lie at the very foundation of our subjectivity. 
Reading “Reflections on the Philosophy of Hitlerism,” one is left with the 
impression that Levinas devoted his life’s work to the task he sets himself 
in this essay—to conceive of humanity in a mode that is entirely beyond 
the “European notion of man” (7)—and that to do so, one must begin with 
the experience of our bodies. It is, first of all, crucial for us to understand 
what it is that Levinas means by the phrase “European notion of man.” 
Secondly, we must consider whether or not his philosophy accomplishes 
this task.   
In what follows, I will trace the argument Levinas presents in 
“Reflections on the Philosophy of Hitlerism,” providing links between this 
early essay and Levinas’ later, major works: Totality and Infinity and 
Otherwise than Being or Beyond Essence. By orienting the later works 
towards “Reflections on the Philosophy of Hitlerism,” I will reveal that at 
the heart of Levinas’ depiction of the subject as creaturely and his 
discussion of subjectivity as substitution lies a political interrogation of the 
liberal tradition. Integral to Levinas’ conception of subjectivity is his deep 
understanding of “the experience of our bodies” (“Reflections” 7) and 
what this experience reveals about individual freedom and the 
asymmetrical responsibility engendered in the ethical relation. 4  As 
creatures, and as subjects in substitution, we experience our own freedom 
as dependent upon our responsibility for the others; the Levinasian subject 
cannot conform to the racist ideology promoted by the philosophy of 
Hiterlism without renouncing her own freedom.  
In “Reflections on the Philosophy of Hitlerism,” Levinas writes 
that the “elementary feelings” awakened by Hitlerism “harbor a 
                                                                                                                         
substitution: the breakup of identity. In their accounts, Levinas’ “correction” of liberalism 
requires rather little of the subject. Neither take account of the radical nature of Levinas’ 
critique of the liberal tradition and even Marx’s economic and political theory. 
Consequently, neither address Levinas’ insistence that the materiality of the body must 
enter into all our social and political deliberations. 
3
 Gad and Asher Horowitz (13) argue persuasively that this phrase refers not to National 
Socialist ideology alone, nor to the work of a specific philosopher, but rather to the 
school of thought associated with German conservatism in the early 20th-century. 
4
 In this, I follow Chanter who characterizes her own interest in “Reflections on the 
Philosophy of Hitlerism” as an attempt to “gain an insight” into the source of Levinas’ 
thought “by laying bare the “original decision” that set Levinas’ thinking in motion” 
(142). While Chanter’s essay is important and formative to my own perspective on this 
early essay of Levinas’, my reading does differ from hers in one important respect. 
Chanter, as does Manning, reads Levinas as approving of the liberal ideal of a 
“community of masters” (142) created in universality. I will take the position that it is 
this desire for mastery that links Western (Christian, liberal) philosophy to the 
domination inherent in the force of expansion utilized by the philosophy of Hitlerism. 





philosophy [and] ...they express a soul’s principal attitude towards the 
whole of reality and its own destiny” (4). These feelings are elementary in 
the sense that they are the basic feelings associated with embodiment, 
material need and dependence that the “European notion of man” (7) 
represses. The philosophy of Hitlerism surpasses the ideology propagated 
by Hitler and his supporters, extending to the point of “question[ing] the 
very principles of a civilization” (4); it reveals that the principles of 
Western civilization are built upon an armature made unsteady by the 
repression of its own material foundations. Writing in 1934, Levinas noted 
that we must not only understand where this philosophy of Hitlerism 
comes from in order to challenge Nazism, but we must also take up the 
critique of European civilization that this philosophy presents. In the 
preface to “Reflections,” written in 1990 with the gift of hindsight and 
with a look to the future, Levinas suggests that the essay asks “if 
liberalism is all we need to achieve an authentic dignity for the human 
subject” (3).  
Levinas neglects to define what he means by “liberalism” in the 
preface, but in the essay itself, he draws our attention to the foundations of 
liberal rights discourse laid out by the 18th century French writers who 
recognized reason as the sovereign triumph of the mind over material 
necessity. The expressed goal of this domination of the material is 
freedom from necessity that opens onto freedom from history. The liberal 
subject is thus free to determine her own destiny; this power of self-
determination ensures that she is in possession of dignity. Because this 
conception of freedom is predicated upon an abstracting discourse of 
natural or divine rights universally possessed by humanity, the liberal 
subject purchases absolute freedom from necessity by denying her 
materiality and thereby forfeiting her uniqueness.  
Levinas hints at this connection between the liberal conception of 
freedom and the logic of universality at the beginning of “Reflections” 
when he notes the insufficiency of a critique of Hitlerism that proceeds by 
opposing Christian universalism to racist particularism. He suggests that 
“the meaning of a logical contradiction that opposes two forms of ideas 
only shows up fully if we go back to their source” (4) and this is what he, 
in fact, enacts in the essay: a return to the source of this logic in “the 
original decision” (4) that makes the linkage of universality and 
particularism possible. Universality, adopted by both Christianity and the 
liberal tradition, inflicts violence upon the particular that it assimilates. 
Repeating the Ancient Greek conception of being as the unity of the many 
in the One, liberalism, out of a fear of the heterogeneity that the other 
represents, seeks to bring alterity back into the fold, as Victoria 
Tahmesebi-Birgani has it, through acts of benevolence (7). This 
continuation of pagan logic within liberalism makes possible the 





reformulation, within the philosophy of Hitlerism, of universality as 
expansionism. 
Levinas finds that neither the Christian tradition nor secularized 
liberalism has freed itself of this elemental urge: the regressive desire for a 
homogenous unification of differentiated being in the One. In “Reflections 
on the Philosophy of Hitlerism,” Levinas takes aim at the pagan logic that 
characterizes the “European notion of Man;” the source of this logic is 
identified in the ancient Greek tradition that precedes and informs Plato’s 
idealism, in which imperfect nature is figured as derivations of the One (in 
the form of the Platonic idea). But, as he is keen to show, this logic 
pervades modern society as well. If we are to stamp out what he refers to 
as paganism (the regression of the differentiated many into a unification 
with the One in which individual responsibility devolves into 
participation), Levinas suggests that we must return to an originating 
monotheism to uncover what was lost in the development of Christianity 
and, later, liberalism.  
Levinas celebrates the liberal tradition for its attempts to enshrine 
dignity and freedom as basic human rights, but he also accuses liberalism 
of failing in its task of guaranteeing individual dignity. Dignity, for 
Levinas and for liberalism, would be the subject’s freedom from coercion 
and objectification; as Kant has it, dignity is conferred upon that which 
has no price within the marketplace (Kant 96-97). In other words, dignity 
is attained in the subject’s freedom from determination by forces beyond 
its control, whether these forces are identified as the elemental evil of the 
pagan unification of the many in the One or as subjection to the logic of 
the capitalist economy. Levinas notes that within the liberal tradition, the 
dignity of the individual is defended with reference to its possession of 
divine or natural rights, or its possession of universal reason. In both 
cases, that which guarantees the subject’s freedom from objectification 
and coercion proceeds by way of objectification and coercion. Rights and 
reason, intended to serve as the bedrock for human dignity, are made into 
objects capable of being possessed. Furthermore, both rights and reason 
are universally possessed by human beings; this logic mirrors the pagan 
unification of the many in the One because within the Kantian moral 
system, all morally correct individual thought and action must conform to 
the general principles of a universal reason. So Levinas concludes that the 
dignity that liberalism claims to guarantee the human subject is the 
decidedly inauthentic dignity of sovereign reason; liberal “freedom” exists 
as conformity.  
Levinas blames this failure to protect humanity from the logic of 
the many in the One on liberalism’s blindness; liberalism is blind to the 
danger inherent in its repression and devaluation of the bodily in favour of 
an abstract reason that has not freed itself from this logic. In rejecting the 
body, liberalism has denied itself resources that could assist philosophy in 





a reorganization of its own faculties that might allow it to resist and 
transcend the logic of the many in the One. Liberalism promulgates a 
dominating subject that declares itself to be free of necessity on the basis 
of force, will, action, and an autonomy paradoxically achieved through its 
own alienation.  
Precisely that which is deemed exterior or inferior to reason returns 
in the form of a philosophical critique of the Enlightenment that Levinas 
dubs the philosophy of Hitlerism. The philosophy of Hitlerism 
reintroduces into thought an explicit engagement with the pagan 
conception of embodiment. Levinas sees this as an important move, 
because it highlights the Enlightenment’s inability to cleanse culture of 
this logic through the process of disenchantment. Levinas notes that we 
must heed the demands of the philosophy of Hiterlism: to re-incorporate 
the material body into our thinking. But for Levinas, the key to this re-
incorporation is to uncover a relation between body and spirit, the physical 
and the abstract that removes us from the plot of the many in the One, 
securing human dignity and freedom through our embodied responsibility 
for the other. 
  
Pardon: The Very Work of Time 
According to the European notion of man, the self is determined to 
be free based on its possession of natural rights. Social bonds come to 
restrict that freedom only after the individual has elected autonomously to 
transfer these rights in order to unite herself with others through entry into 
a social contract.5 The absolute freedom associated with life in a state of 
nature is traded in for a conception of freedom as liberty within social 
bounds. Within social contract theory, freedom is conceived of as freedom 
from the natural conditions of humanity. The autonomy of the self is 
predicated upon a repression of the natural and the bodily. In this sacrifice 
of individual rights and freedoms to membership within a social and 
political group, we see a repetition of the pagan logic of the many in the 
                                                 
5
 Social contract theory begins, of course, with Hobbes’s theory of the Leviathan, and 
receives fine-tuning in the philosophies of Locke and Kant. It reaches its penultimate 
moment with Rousseau, whose work can be seen as a critique and a reformation of the 
earlier social contract theorists. Rousseau famously chided social contract theorists for 
their depiction of man in a state of nature, arguing that their states of nature included far 
too much culture. Levinas’ description of “the European notion of man” seems much 
closer to Hobbes than any other social contract philosopher, in that Hobbes conceives of 
human beings as primarily atomistic, and engaged in a struggle for power within a closed 
mechanical social system. The sense of a “European notion of man,” to which Levinas’ 
opposes subjectivity as substitution, would thus be atomistic, self-interested, self-
preserving, in a proprietary relation to itself, and locked into mechanical relations with 
other human beings, bounded by a finite and totalizing power structure.  
 





One. In “Reflections on the Philosophy of Hitlerism,” Levinas traces the 
liberal claim for the autonomy of the self historically, arguing that it 
develops out of the idea of the soul in monotheistic thought that is itself a 
reaction to the way in which history and time are conceived as fate and 
destiny within the pagan world. In the progressively abstract development 
from Christian soul to liberal self, an important linkage between 
embodiment and individual freedom is denied, and this denial facilitates 
the liberal subject’s sacrifice of its own potential dignity when entering 
into the social contract.  
 According to the pagan worldview, we are fundamentally bound to 
a past that cannot be sufficiently altered in the present. For the pagan, 
every act performed fails to achieve the status of an original act; within the 
passage of time, human action is doomed to be a mere continuation of 
immanent existence, an eternal submission to fate. The pagan conceives 
his or her life as predetermined by fate, while, within the liberal tradition, 
it is posited that the autonomous individual, freed from the unchanging 
past, controls her own destiny, thereby securing her individual dignity. 
The sovereignty of reason surpasses the freedom offered by the Christian 
notion of the soul in that decisions made about one’s present and future 
acts need not concern history, necessity, the will of God, nor even a 
relationship to one’s fellows; the only basis for decision is decidedly 
abstract Enlightenment rationality. Through the sovereignty of reason, the 
human being is absolutely freed of all material concerns, and even of 
psychological need; faith in reason, Levinas writes, possesses a mystical 
power that “exorcises physical, psychological, and social matter. The light 
of reason was enough to chase away the shadows of irrationality” 
(“Reflections” 6). The liberal subject is constituted as an immaterial entity 
entirely devoid of corporeal concerns such as hunger and scarcity—the 
very material concerns that force us to make decisions about whether we 
behave in an ethical or an evil manner towards our fellow human beings. 
For the liberal subject, these moral and ethical decisions can only be 
determined as objectively rational or irrational; all moral decisions take on 
the character of rational calculation. The members of this rational 
community are treated as abstract entities; in their distance from the 
material world, and hence, one another, liberal subjects become “a 
community of masters” (11): equivalent to one another, and thereby 
interchangeable.  
 In light of this, Levinas suggests that true freedom—a break with 
the subject’s submission to fate, whether we speak of this as a 
characteristic of life in the ancient or the modern world—requires a “true 
present” (4-5): a moment in time in which destiny is interrupted and begun 
again. In this true present, the passage of time is reversible, and the human 
being stands at the crossroads of the two directions in which time travels. 
Levinas identifies the promise of this reversibility of time (the promise of 





a true present) with the Judaic promise of redemption, and implies that in 
the development of Christian and liberal thought this true redemption is 
replaced by a faith in abstraction that returns us to the plot of the pagan. 
He explains that with the arrival of monotheism (in the form of Judaism),6 
“remorse—the painful expression of a radical powerlessness to redeem the 
irreparable—heralds the repentance that generates the pardon that 
redeems. Man finds something in the present with which he can modify or 
efface the past. Time loses its very irreversibility” (5). However, Levinas 
does not clearly specify from where this remorse arises is in this early 
essay.  
 Time becomes reversible when man learns to repent past actions. 
Levinas implies in “Reflections on the Philosophy of Hitlerism” that this 
specifically Judaic ability to modify the past through pardon makes 
possible the Christian notion of the separated soul as well as the liberal 
conception of the subject as wholly self-sufficient. However, the 
independence and atomism we see developing out of the Christian 
tradition are not characteristic of Levinas’ conception of Judaism. While 
the Jew labours in repentance, the Christian is delivered the true present 
and freedom from mythic fate through his or her faith in the crucifixion 
and the Eucharist. The Christian is reborn into freedom from the past, free 
to choose his or her destiny. So for Levinas, Christianity heralds a radical 
freedom; he writes: “not only is the choice of destiny a free one. Once the 
choice is made, it does not form a chain” (5). Every choice, commitment, 
and repentance is itself open to reconsideration and modification. In this 
sense, the past is subordinate to the present, and the Christian has no 
history that could limit her freedom. A slogan displayed on the marquee 
sign of an evangelical church demonstrates this point of view: “God 
allows u-turns.” The spontaneous, originating, and infinite freedom that 
                                                 
6
 Levinas limits his discussion of “monotheism” in “Reflections on the Philosophy of 
Hitlerism” to only two of the religions of the Book: Judaism and Christianity. The essay 
under review here, written for a Catholic journal (L’Esprit), addresses, in part, the 
potential (or lack thereof) resources within Christian thought for mounting a resistance to 
the philosophy of Hitlerism and Nazi ideology. It is likely that the specific audience to 
which the essay is addressed accounts for its engagement with certain aspects of 
monotheism at the expense of others. Nonetheless, it is undeniable that Levinas’ 
philosophy emerges out of an idiosyncratic reading of Judaism that attempts to rescue 
and mobilize the originating anti-pagan impulse motivating Judaism itself. Christianity 
appears in his work, as it does here, as an outgrowth of Judaism that incorporates the 
pagan Greek tradition into its theology and philosophy. Hence, Judaism is treated as the 
non-European monotheistic tradition that contains the resources necessary to counter the 
pagan logic of the many in the One. Islam, of course, receives short shrift from Levinas 
here, as it does throughout his work. It is quite clear that for Levinas “monotheism” refers 
to its original manifestation within Judaism. Christianity and Islam, according to Levinas, 
stray too far from the aim of the originating monotheism: to rid the chosen people of their 
pagan beliefs and practices.  
  





Christianity makes possible animates the Christian notion of the soul. 
Levinas argues that the Christian soul is not an abstraction; it is, he writes, 
“the concrete and positive power to become detached and abstract” (6). 
The past is no longer a limitation upon human freedom, because the 
Christian soul provides mankind with the mechanism through which one 
escapes the past by detaching oneself from it. 
 Classical liberalism, Christianity and Judaism share the desire to be 
freed from the limitations of the time of being, which, conforming to 
pagan fate and the logic of the many in the One, is determined as a 
synthetic totality demanding conformity to the same. But unlike the Judeo-
Christian conception of freedom, liberalism guarantees this flight from 
history and necessity as an absolute freedom. The sovereignty of reason 
operates outside and above everyday concrete existence, because, 
according to Enlightenment thought, what is truly human transcends 
community with other human beings or obedience to God—the social and 
religious structure that both makes freedom possible in the Judeo-
Christian world and simultaneously limits and qualifies the freedom it 
provides. This becomes especially problematic when considered in light of 
the argument presented above: that in liberating itself from material 
necessity, Enlightenment does not free itself from pagan logic, but in fact, 
further entrenches itself within the plot of the pagan by blocking a 
potential egress from this logic when it turns away from the concrete body 
and towards abstraction. The philosophy of Hitlerism returns to a pagan 
conception of the concretion of the soul within the body; this allows 
Levinas the opportunity to identify this potential exit point.  
 Although Levinas does not identify the origin of the remorse that 
redeems in “Reflections on the Philosophy of Hitlerism,” when he returns 
to the “true present” (4-5) that makes possible redemption and pardon in 
Totality and Infinity, Levinas introduces fecundity as the relation to the 
other that opens infinite time. Fecundity is a relationship with an other 
beyond the progressive temporality of history.7 The biological origins of 
the concept of fecundity—its very concreteness as a description of the 
relation between the I and the being that the I engenders (the father and the 
son)8—means that the production of this relation that opens upon infinite 
                                                 
7
 For Levinas, the term “history” in Totality and Infinity refers to the totalized, universal 
history we most readily associate with Hegel. The relation of fecundity is also beyond 
politics, or at least, politics as Levinas defines the term in Totality and Infinity: “the art of 
foreseeing war and of winning it by every means” (21). 
8
 Levinas’ language here is infamously gender-specific. The subject is always masculine, 
the child is always the son and the production of the son requires an erotic relation with 
the feminine. This gendered language runs through the entirety of Totality and Infinity, 
but it is especially present in other sections on dwelling and language, into which the 
subject must be welcomed by the feminine. For the purposes of this discussion, I will 
take Levinas at his word when he intimates that the feminine aspect of being that he 





time9 is created and experienced within the finite time of history itself. But 
as it enters into the said (the language of being), this relation loses its 
openness to the other, as it is transformed into a means, subsumed into the 
totalizing rationality of being. Fecundity is thus a relation with an other 
that defies the laws of formal logic; it is complicit with the totalizing logic 
of the totality, but it is also a site of resistance to it. It establishes identity 
itself as multiple in that the subject sees herself (and not merely her 
reflection) in the gestures and characteristics of the child; the child is 
“mine in a certain sense or, more exactly, me, but not myself” (Totality 
and Infinity 271). Fecundity “articulates the time of the absolutely other, 
an alteration of the very substance of him who can—his trans-
substantiation” (268-269). The very identity of the subject we associate 
with power, agency and possibility is altered in fecundity.  
 The discontinuous and infinite time of fecundity, according to 
Levinas, is a break-up of the progressive march of time, and it “makes 
possible an absolute youth and recommencement” (282). This 
recommencement is not a reversion to the self-sufficient subject that is 
identical to itself; it is rather a recommencement of youthfulness as a 
mode of being and experiencing that is not conditioned by the synthesis of 
events dominating the totality. In fecundity, the past is not recommenced 
through memory, which subjects the past to a finite narrative leading 
always to the present moment of the aging subject. Rather, fecundity 
makes possible a return to the past that is free of the synthetic time of 
                                                                                                                         
refers to in Totality and Infinity does not refer to an empirical female being. He 
announces there that “the feminine has been encountered in this analysis as one of the 
cardinal points of the horizon in which the inner life takes place—and the empirical 
absence of the human being of “feminine sex” in a dwelling nowise affects the dimension 
of femininity which remains open there, as the very welcome of the dwelling” (158). In 
“The Delightful Other: Portraits of the Feminine in Kierkegaard, Nietzsche, and 
Levinas,” Sonia Sikka takes issue with this, on the grounds that the feminine, for Levinas, 
constitutes a “break” in the “virile” identity of the masculine. From my perspective this is 
only a problem if “the feminine” is conflated with concrete females. One hopes that the 
subject does not have to identify as male. For it seems to me that the form of subjectivity 
that Levinas refers to using masculine pronouns could just as easily, and perhaps more 
precisely as well, be labeled the self-identical dominating liberal subject (which has 
historically been the domain most closely associated with men and patriarchal culture and 
social structure within the modern period). No doubt this nomenclature is, although 
potentially more precise, also a bit of a mouthful. Nonetheless, this subject’s counterpart, 
who introduces difference and enters into an erotic relation that results in the trans-
substantiation of the liberal subject in the relation of fecundity, would therefore be 
feminine only in that it would be everything that the masculine, dominating, self-identical 
subject of liberalism is not. It would be an interruption of masculine virility, but this is 
not, in itself, a bad thing. 
9
 Fecundity is, therefore, in excess of universal history and the totalized politics of 
opposition. 
 





history and therefore allows “free interpretation and free choice” (282). 
The freedom referred to here is a freedom from the pagan logic 
characterized by a repetition of the same, since, in fecundity, the relation 
between past, present, and future no longer has the totalizing characteristic 
of the inevitable playing out of fate, an inevitable unification of the many 
in the One. “This recommencement of the instant, this triumph of the time 
of fecundity over the becoming of the mortal and aging being,” according 
to Levinas, “is a pardon, the very work of time” (282).   
 Pardon is the very work of time because pardon can only be given 
from the perspective of a looking back, and because it institutes a relation 
to the passage of time that is transcendent of the totalizing progressive 
time that Levinas takes to be the time of being. The event to be pardoned 
must have occurred in the past, but the ability to pardon the offence 
requires the reversibility of time that the “true present” (“Reflections” 4-5) 
and fecundity accomplishes. Levinas explains that “the paradox of pardon 
lies in its retroaction; from the point of view of common time it represents 
an inversion of the natural order of things, the reversibility of time” 
(Totality and Infinity 283). To pardon is neither to forget, nor to remember 
the offence that occurred in the past. Forgetting it would be to move on 
from the event without responsibility taken or forgiveness granted, while 
memory would thematize the event in the unfolding of synthetic, finite 
time. Forgetting erases the events of the past, while pardon “acts upon the 
past event, purifying it” (283). Pardon preserves and transforms the past in 
that the offence is neither forgotten nor remembered.  
 To pardon is not to proclaim the innocence of the perpetrator, but 
rather to transform him or her from the guilty into the purified. The 
original event serves as the “felix culpa” (283) that brings reconciliation. 
This is why innocence is not to be held above pardon; it is not better to be 
sinless, as the state of sin that requires pardon is the very thing that opens 
the redemptive and ethical relation of fecundity. There can be no 
transformative redemption of the subject without a prior fault requiring 
redress. The future “comes to me across an absolute interval whose other 
shore the Other absolutely other—though he may be my son—is alone 
capable of marking, and of connecting with the past” (283). Pardon itself 
is not within my own grasp; it can only emerge from the other, and the 
pardon granted by the son offers to me my future. This future is not 
infinitely open, but neither is it determined by the endless repetition of 
events in the pagan sense of time as a totality. It is determined in and as 
the relation of fecundity in which I am I and not I, self and other.   
 The relation of fecundity between father and son (whether these 
terms are taken as description of a biological relation or a social relation) 
makes possible the “true present” (“Reflections” 4-5) that Levinas links to 
Judaism and the promise of redemption in “Reflections on the Philosophy 
of Hitlerism.” In the earlier essay remorse for past actions “heralds the 





repentance that generates the pardon that redeems” (5). In Totality and 
Infinity, Levinas explicitly presents pardon, and the transcendence of 
synthetic time, oriented toward pagan destiny, that it engenders, as a 
function of a relation. This relation has its origin in the biological, but 
unfurls within the social. So some of the puzzles that present themselves 
in Levinas’ earlier and partial reflections on time, pardon, repentance and 
redemption are worked out more explicitly in the notion of fecundity in 
Totality and Infinity. Fecundity offers the same reversibility of time, the 
same pardon and redemption we see in what Levinas refers to earlier as 
the “true present” (4-5) opened by monotheism, but, unlike the 
reversibility of time offered by liberalism (which requires no other to grant 
me pardon) it is possible only in a relation between the self and the other 
that opens upon the infinite, and brings infinite time into the time of 
history. In “Reflections on the Philosophy of Hitlerism,” the “something” 
that man finds “in the present with which he can modify or efface the 
past” (5) remains poorly articulated. In Totality and Infinity, we find that 
this “something” (5) is the very relation between “man and man” and “the 
I and itself” (Totality and Infinity 306): fecundity.  
   
“The Experience of Our Bodies” 
In “Reflections on the Philosophy of Hitlerism,” Levinas suggests 
that humanity is imperilled by liberal thought because of its adherence to 
the primacy of an abstractly defined freedom of rights over the call to 
responsibility entailed in social relations: “once the distance [between man 
and the world of ideas] has been crossed and the truth grasped, man 
nonetheless retains his freedom. Man can regain control and go back on 
his choice. … This freedom constitutes the whole of thought’s dignity, but 
it also harbours its danger. … Thought becomes a game.” (“Reflections” 
10) According to the liberal tradition, the dignity of thought lies in its 
absolute freedom from determination—even to the point that the 
individual retains her freedom in the face of a truth grasped. When thought 
becomes a game, the human being is incapable of commitment. Hence, 
liberal philosophy, which declares (and claims to protect) the existing 
freedom of the subject, potentially devolves into a lack of commitment to 
one’s own thought in favour of the status quo. The absolute freedom of 
sovereign reason, Levinas argues, results in a kind of relativism that (on an 
individual level) makes sincerity “impossible,” and “puts an end to all 
heroism” and (in its wider social effect) produces a society that “accepts 
degenerate forms of the ideal” (10).  
 Levinas writes that “it is to a society in such a condition that the 
Germanic ideal of man seems to promise sincerity and authenticity” (10). 
The ascension of “the Germanic ideal of man” (10) means that thought can 
no longer be conceived as a game, because one cannot freely choose 





between rational ideas. The playful uncertainty of liberal thought is 
replaced with a thought of seriousness and import that has the power to 
affect the spiritual and material conditions of humanity. In the National 
Socialists’ exploitation of this new conception of man, ideas are judged to 
be authentic—and therefore, true—if they exhibit an eternal tie to the 
racialized body and its mythic past.        
What is at issue here in this development from the Christian 
conception of the concrete soul, making abstraction possible, to liberal 
declarations of absolute freedom, is the way in which this freedom 
untethers the subject from its body, and from the material world. The 
concrete freedom of the soul, which frees one from the unalterable 
circumstances of the concrete body, is transformed in liberal thought. 
Freed from all material concerns, the liberal subject is free also from a 
material referent, and this, perhaps, is its most dangerous quality. 
Astonishingly, Levinas suggests in “Reflections on the Philosophy of 
Hitlerism” that it is the philosophy of Hiterlism itself that offers a possible 
antidote to the dangerous liberal conception of freedom, and the European 
notion of man in which it participates. Undoubtedly, the specific form that 
this anchoring of the self to the body takes on in the philosophy of 
Hitlerism is completely unacceptable to Levinas. However, its core 
assertion—that the body and the self are inseparable—will continue to 
inform his entire body of work. In this early text, Levinas explicitly argues 
that liberalism cannot mount a defense against the philosophy of 
Hitlerism. This would require a philosophy that takes the philosophy of 
Hitlerism seriously, and begins where it begins: with the inseparability of 
body and self.  
The feeling of identity between self and body that liberalism 
attempts to repress in the name of a sovereign reason is confirmed in what 
Levinas calls “the experience of our bodies” (7). Levinas identifies the 
experience of pain as an absolute limit case for this feeling of identity. In 
the experience of physical pain, the spirit longs to flee the body, rebel 
against the body and “go beyond it” (8). But, Levinas contends, it is the 
very impossibility of this escape that constitutes pain itself.  Levinas 
argues that “[The] adherence [of the body] to the Self is of value in itself. 
It is an adherence that one does not escape and that no metaphor can 
confuse with the presence of an external object; it is a union that does not 
in any way alter the tragic character of finality.” (8, emphasis in the 
original) Spirit finds its very identity as spirit in this rebellion against the 
pain of embodiment, but suppresses knowledge of this origin in its 
successive moves away from the material and towards abstraction. 
Liberalism misrecognizes the meaning of the identity of body and self; it 
reacts in fear, seeing this union as the force that denies human beings their 
dignity. In repressing this relation between the body and the self, 





liberalism erroneously bars the subject access to its potential liberation 
from the logic of the many in the One. 
The experience of pain as a failed flight from this unity between 
self and body demonstrates that the body cannot be treated as an object 
external to the self (as it appears throughout the European philosophical 
tradition). The fact that the self is intractably intertwined with the body 
reveals the lie within liberalism’s claim that a sovereign spirit can enter 
into equal and just relations with others based on its rationalized and 
abstract freedom from the material constraints of the body. Liberalism 
fails to deliver on its promise of freedom and equality precisely because it 
guarantees freedom and equality through an abstract formalism that 
ignores the material inequalities and differences that exist between 
concrete bodies.  
In contrast, the feeling of identity between the self and the body 
forms the core of the philosophy of Hitlerism. The human being, once 
described as the animal capable of rising out of its animality through its 
development of sovereign reason, is now, within the philosophy of 
Hitlerism, conceived as the biological site of spirit’s concretization. Not 
only the ethical and political nature of man, but the entirety of his 
existence is cemented within a biologically determined concept of being. 
Spirit accepts its bondage to the body, and a society is formed based upon 
common blood; the pagan reduction of the many to the One is transformed 
into a reduction of the many to the species—to the people—to the Volk. 
And, then, as Levinas writes, “if race does not exist, one has to invent it!” 
(9).  
Levinas describes the difference between the liberal conception of 
the subject as free and the sense of bondage that defines subjectivity 
according to the philosophy of Hiterlism: 
Man’s essence no longer lies in freedom, but in a kind of bondage. 
To be truly oneself does not mean taking flight once more above 
contingent events that always remain foreign to one’s freedom; on 
the contrary, it means becoming aware of the ineluctable original 
chain that is unique to our bodies, and above all, accepting this 
chaining. (9) 
The philosophy of Hitlerism interprets this enchainment to mean that I am 
chained to my material body and through that material body I am chained 
to those who share my blood in the present, to those of similar stock who 
precede me, and to the future of the race to which I belong. But, for 
Levinas, this enchainment means something very different than what it 
means for the National Socialists.  
The recognition that “man’s essence … lies … in a kind of 
bondage” (9) between self and body furnishes the necessary insight 





informing Levinas’ speculation about an otherwise than being or a beyond 
essence to which the experience of the body bears witness, and facilitates 
Levinas’ critical alteration of Husserlian phenomenology. Husserl’s 
idealist theory of subjectivity is countered by Levinas’ phenomenological 
description of the experience of our bodies, which treats sensation and 
affect as pre-reflective embodied cognitions. Levinas’ attunement to the 
experience of our bodies reveals the existence of gaps in the totality of 
being as constituted by the Husserlian subject. These gaps, Levinas 
suggests, point to a fuller sense of subjectivity, and bear witness to the 
otherwise than being as that which cannot enter into the totality, and that 
therefor, maintains the possibility of resistance to it.   
Levinas chronicles the problematic nature of Husserl’s 
phenomenological reduction in his Theory of Intuition in Husserl’s 
Phenomenology, in which he argues that the life offered to theoretical 
reflection is not philosophically neutral; it is rather, as John Drabinski puts 
it, the “theoretical life of the subject in the natural attitude” (Theory 31). 
Because Husserl’s method brackets existence, that which is subjected to 
reduction in Husserl does not include the full range of affective and pre-
reflective experience. Levinas, according to Drabinski, notes that 
Husserl’s reduction reveals “only the theoretical content latent in the pre-
reflective” (31). In this, Husserl conforms to the pagan logic of the many 
in the One, as the transcendental subject becomes the origin from which 
all meaning and significance of being is derived. In contrast, the reduction 
as it is mobilized by Levinas is not a reduction to essence (as it is for 
Husserl), but a reduction beyond essence: a reduction beyond the 
philosophical system that takes knowledge of essence as its goal. Levinas 
expands that which is to be reduced from the latent constitutions of the 
ego to that which exceeds the theoretical perspective of the ego: the 
sensual and the affective. While Husserl’s parenthetical reduction 
spiritualizes matter by reducing entities and things to their essence, 
Levinas’ reduction is “the reduction to signification, to the one-for-the-
other involved in responsibility, in substitution, to the locus or non-lieu, 
locus and non-lieu, the utopia, of the human” (Otherwise than Being 45). 
For Husserl, memory and historiography are tools of consciousness 
that allow for the retention of identity by transforming difference (for 
example, in aging) into mere modification. In this sense, consciousness is 
conservative, and exists on a plane bounded by recuperable time. But 
against Husserl, and as we have seen hints of already in our discussion of 
pardon, Levinas argues that sensibility itself is not bound by being or 
consciousness, is not identical with “a time of what can be recuperated” 
(34) by consciousness. Not everything sensed and sensing enters into the 
synthetic time in which the self-identical exhibition of being takes place. 
The simultaneity of both lived experience and the objective order of 
denomination within sensibility indicates instead, for Levinas, that time 





itself is irreducibly diachronic. And this diachrony indicates that the 
subject as sensibility cannot be identical with consciousness, because 
diachrony contains the immemorial not due to a “weakness of memory” 
(38), but because time cannot “assemble itself in the present” (38).  
Within the time of being, organized as a totality, the subject is self-
identical; its meaning is derived from its essence. But what the experience 
of our bodies teaches us, is that this mode of constitutive subjectivity is 
predicated upon an ethical subjectivity that can be described as sensibility 
and as a substitution for the other, and this fundamental subjectivity is 
experienced beyond the time of being, as the otherwise than being. In the 
very moment in which I sense the other, my response, prior to her call, and 
prior to my conscious awareness of any intention, ethical or otherwise, on 
my part, is expressed in my substitution for her. For Levinas, the sensible 
“binds the node of incarnation into a plot larger than the apperception of 
the self. In this plot I am bound to others before being tied to my body” 
(76). Prior to my recognition of the enchainment of self and body and the 
attempt to escape this enchainment, I am already undeniably bound up in a 
relation of substitution for the other, because I exist as a sensing, feeling 
subject. 
Levinas describes the subject in substitution as “denuded, stripped 
bare” (54), without the protection of ego identity or of “its solid crust” 
(49). The self is torn away from its own inwardness and self-same-ness as 
the other penetrates the unity at the very core of identity, and opens the 
self up to ethics. This penetration is substitution, in which I offer myself as 
a hostage in place of the other. But this bond does not resolve into unity 
with undifferentiated being in a repetition of the pagan logic of the many 
in the One, because when I enter into a relation of substitution for the 
other, I am absolved from ego-identity, without being alienated from my 
self. The denominations and qualities attributed to me within the totality of 
being are no longer of consequence, but rather than this being a negation 
of essence—or, rather, an experience of being alienated from my 
essence—Levinas states that “this absolution reverses essence” (50) into a 
disinterestedness. This disinterestedness is identity transformed: the 
reversion of the ego to a self, a reversion from the conscious and willing 
being to the passivity of the creaturely subject in substitution for the other. 
The subject here is not an abstraction that can be made adequate to a 
general category or equivalent to other subjects or objects subjected to 
universalization and reification. Stripped of the identity afforded it within 
the said, the subject is exposed, denuded as the singular and unique being 
substituted for the other.  
Levinas writes that the reversion from the ego to the self takes the 
form of “a corporeal life devoted to expression and to giving. It is devoted, 
and does not devote itself: it is a self despite itself, in incarnation, where it 
is the very possibility of offering, suffering and trauma” (50). The 





modality of disinterestedness and the call to responsibility it answers are 
inescapable because they are irrevocably bound to incarnation. To live in 
and as a body is to be devoted, prior to any act of self-devotion, to giving 
to the other, and to substitution. The subject is utterly passive, beyond the 
passivity that would be opposed to activity, and passive prior to any 
contract (social or otherwise) entered into. It does not have a narrative of 
its own that centers and grounds it, providing it with a place from which to 
launch projects or in which to exercise free will. According to Levinas, 
“the subject… does not give signs, it becomes a sign, turns into an 
allegiance” (49). If the subject merely gave out signs, this would mean that 
it was at home with itself, self-identical, sheltered from vulnerability. But 
the subject in the ethical relation is not a for-itself. Subjectivity is an 
allegiance; subjectivity is a sign that signifies “I am for you.” 
In Otherwise than Being, Levinas conceives of the subject not as a 
thing, but fundamentally, as a creature—as that which has been created as 
uniquely singular. This singularity of the subject is incompatible with the 
totality as a universalizing force requiring the standardization and 
exchangeability of all human beings for one another in the liberal ideal of 
universality. The subject returns to this creaturely form in the moment that 
it is cast outside of the totality that would furnish its identity as a part of 
the whole, a derivation of the One. This moment of recoil is the 
unidentifiable and non-thematizable event of the call of the other. The 
most emphatic description of Levinas’ sense of ethical subjectivity comes 
from Asher Horowitz, who writes in the Preface to his Ethics at a 
Standstill that the subject “is not only in this relation but also is this 
relation”(Horowitz x). In other words, there is no subjectivity without the 
ethical relation that binds me in responsibility to the other, because 
subjectivity is not identity; it is the ethical bond itself. 
The passivity of the subject is prior to the dualism that conceives 
being in terms of the split between nature and spirit, body and mind. 
Radical passivity is not the passivity of a spatio-temporal body, but rather 
the passivity of a created entity prior to its entry onto the ontological plane 
that separates the spiritual from the physical—prior to the 
conceptualization of spiritual and physical as separate spheres of 
experience and influence. “Popular materialism” (“Reflections” 8) is 
insufficient to the task of describing subjectivity and the ethical relation 
because “obsession is anarchical; it accuses me beneath the level of prime 
matter” (Otherwise than Being 110). My obsession with the other, my 
inability to leave the other alone with her suffering, cannot be located and 
worked through psychologically, because it accuses me of my 
insufficiency prior to my formation as a self-identical ego.  
 It is only through incarnation as compassion and as an exposure to 
suffering (my own and the suffering of others) that the self exists at all. 
The gift of subjectivity arises out of the suffering of the self and in answer 





to the suffering of the other. The freedom that arises in the creation of the 
subject as ethical relation is the freedom from one’s immersion in the 
totality and freedom from the obsession with one’s own biological 
suffering. The body exposes us to “the gift that costs” (195, note 12). 
What does this gift cost us but our very identity within the ontological 
order?  
 
The Universal and the Particular: Freedom Otherwise 
In the transformation of the philosophy of Hitlerism into a political 
program, blood becomes the pagan One into which the many are dissolved 
in anonymous participation. Personal responsibility devolves into personal 
devotion to the Volk. It is at this point, that we see the emergence of 
elemental evil clearly; as ego identity dissolves into a unified and 
undifferentiated whole, (be that whole defined in terms of nation, race, or 
state)—there is a significant reduction in personal responsibility. The 
deficit of real fraternity and community engendered by liberalism 
(although it is purportedly dedicated to the promotion of these ideals) is 
replaced by an all-encompassing allegiance to the Volk. The freedom 
guaranteed by this allegiance is the freedom from responsibility for and to 
others not of one’s own race.  
The new notion of community introduced by the philosophy of 
Hitlerism, delimited as it is by biology, needs signifying others: those who 
embody that which is not pure in contrast to the true race, and can, 
therefore, serve as scapegoat in the purification of the community. 
Interestingly, Levinas makes no overtures towards a theory of anti-
Semitism here, nor does he display any interest in roughly contemporary 
attempts to understand anti-Semitism in terms of Freudian theories of 
group psychology. 10  Such theories do not correspond to Levinas’ 
understanding, further developed in Otherwise than Being, of a primordial 
relation that opens upon both the possibility of murder and a potential 
ethical relation between self and other in which I am for the other. The 
follower of Nazism capitulates his or her abstract freedom and autonomy 
to a force beyond his or her control in order that he or she might 
paradoxically gain a measure of control over social relations in the 
material world. Liberalism had promised to deliver this control to the 
hands of the rational subject, but it always disappoints in this regard 
because it has not liberated the subject from the pagan logic of the many in 
the One. For Levinas, what is of paramount importance in the fascist will 
to power is its character as an escape from the demands of the other upon 
                                                 
10
 I am thinking specifically here of “Elements of Anti-Semitism: Limits of 
Enlightenment” in Horkheimer and Adorno’s Dialectic of Enlightenment. 
 





me. Liberalism represses this demand, but this repression is a mere 
evasion that leaves us even more vulnerable to fascism, given that it 
denies us the insight into the otherwise than being via the experience of 
our bodies.  
In “Reflections on the Philosophy of Hitlerism,” Levinas concerns 
himself with the ideological and spiritual dimensions of evil, which he 
recognizes as a force present within liberal philosophy as well as Nazi 
ideology. In the earlier essay, Levinas targets “the European notion of 
man,” but later, in his dedication to Otherwise than Being or Beyond 
Essence to “the millions on millions of all confessions and all nations, 
victims of the same hatred of the other man, the same anti-semitism,” he 
seems to extend this wasted potential for freedom beyond the specific 
context of European culture. Levinas suggests there that any attempt to 
understand eruptions of anti-Semitism as particular events within history 
risks evading the source of anti-Semitism itself: the fear of the other’s 
claim on me that erupts into a violent embrace of sameness. This reticence 
on Levinas’ part to preserve the specific social, political, ideological and 
economic roots of Nazi anti-Semitism might very well be seen as a 
weakness, 11  but it is also a strength, in that it serves as an excellent 
explanation for the resiliency of pagan logic. 
                                                 
11
 A potentially troubling way in which Levinas himself falls short of his aims to counter 
the “European notion of man” surfaces when we turn to consider his remarks regarding 
non-European and non-Judaic cultures, particularly his disdain for and fear of African 
culture (expressed in an interview published in Raoul Mortley’s French Philosophers in 
Conversation) and what Howard Caygill has argued is Levinas’ refusal to see the 
Palestinian as the other. Taking Levinas to task for his reliance on the feminine in 
Totality and Infinity and his admission that although he refuses to see his claim that the 
Jews and the Greeks are the only human civilizations as a racist statement, Sonia Sikka 
agues: “this is a philosophy of the Other that, although it claims to be based on 
difference, is in another sense, indifferent to difference.”  She makes an important point 
that Levinas’ philosophy, if it is viewed from the vantage point of the Western tradition 
—“male, European and Greco-Christian” (114)—looks like the interruption it claims to 
be. But outside of that tradition, Levinas’ philosophy seems to have more in common 
with the European notion of man. These are important criticisms that I do not intend to 
sweep aside, but it occurs to me that they should be taken as appeals to read Levinas 
differently and productively to engage with the original impulse that motivates the 
philosophy itself, to rescue what we can of the most radical aspects of Levinas’ 
philosophy of the ethical relation, and to return to the core of Levinas’ philosophy —the 
otherwise than being positioned as a potential challenge to the totality of being—in order 
to reconfigure his philosophy as a philosophy of the Other that registers the pain and 
shock of difference without itself being allergic to it. Levinas’ philosophy is difficult to 
come to terms with, because it is both a philosophy that upholds the value of singularity 
and a philosophy that attempts to propose an understanding of the human condition. As 
such, it both affirms and denies difference. I suggest that it is important to read it 
diachronically, understanding the universal human condition of substitution as that which 
makes possible a commitment to a philosophy of difference.  





Levinas concludes that Hitlerism (and racism in general) is not 
merely an isolated particularism that opposes itself to some aspects of 
Western culture. Hitlerism institutes itself as the force that will form a new 
world. The creation of this world will require a new conception of truth, 
radically opposed to the subjective truth subordinated to the free choice of 
a sovereign reason; “truth is no longer … the contemplation of a foreign 
spectacle; instead it consists in a drama in which man is himself the actor” 
(“Reflections” 10). Within this drama, the individual is as bound to truth 
as she is to biological being. And the bind between individual, truth, and 
biology is a shared one— shared with, but limited to, all the other 
members of the society of consanguinity to which the individual belongs. 
Levinas observes that in order to guarantee the sincerity and authenticity 
this new conception of truth promises to deliver, it must be absolute—not 
merely “my truth” (10). In other words, it must have the character of a 
universal truth, but this will necessitate “a basic modification of the very 
idea of universality” (10).           
 The notion that Hitlerism could found a new world, that it sees 
itself capable of asserting a truth that could be conceived as absolute and 
universal seems illogical, even paradoxical. For how could the very 
particular case of a self-declared superior race become a universally 
acceptable ideology? Levinas maintains that in order for this situation to 
develop, “universality must give way to the idea of expansion” (10, 
emphasis in the original). No longer can the universal be thought of as an 
idea propagated in the spirit of liberal equalization that “creates a 
community of masters” (11). Chanter and Manning have both read 
Levinas’ distinction between the liberal ideal of mastery through 
universalization and the fascist will to expansion as a partial acceptance of 
liberalism. But I argue that this destruction of “the community of masters” 
(11) is not, in itself, mourned by Levinas. Furthermore, the universalizing 
logic of liberalism itself makes possible this giving way. The notion of a 
community of masters is a problematic formulation, since, as an abstract 
and rational “community” of “peers” (11) it does not reflect the essentially 
asymmetrical relationship between self and other that he will address in 
his later works.  
 While liberalism represses difference and the asymmetrical ethical 
relation in its promotion of universality, the philosophy of Hitlerism 
replaces the force of this “community of masters” (11) with the expansive 
force of mastery in a particular form. Under the political rule of the 
National Socialists and within the philosophical logic of Hitlerism, 
universal agreement will be instituted by force—a force of expansion that 
upholds the masterful control of the so-called superior race over all others. 
Rather than the supposedly anonymous and neutral character of the 
universal idea within liberalism, the force of expansionism “is attached to 
the personality or society exerting it, enlarging that person or society while 





subordinating the rest” (11). The philosophy of Hitlerism’s modification 
of the idea of universality is generally read as a break with Europe’s 
liberal and Enlightened past, yet for Levinas, it reveals the legacy of the 
pagan logic of the many in the One that continues to exert its influence 
over this tradition. In the wake of the philosophy of Hitlerism, any attempt 
to attain the truth through the categorical rationality that subsumes 
particulars under the cover of a universal should be recognized with some 
suspicion. 
 The philosophy of Hiterlism offers a critique of the European 
tradition of liberalism and of “the European notion of man” that reveals 
the pagan logic at the heart of the problematic concept of universality. In 
forging a philosophy capable of countering both the European notion of 
man and the racist ideology that it facilitates, Levinas introduces us to an 
ethical relation that exits outside of this logic. Because time is 
diachronous, Levinas can claim that the time of being can correspond to 
the logic of the many in the One, while the subject in substitution for the 
other, the subject as sensibility, even though it is a fundamentally 
universal condition for all humanity, remains beyond this logic. In 
Otherwise than Being or Beyond Essence, Levinas writes: “To say that the 
ego is a substitution is then not to state the universality of a principle, the 
quiddity of an ego, but, quite the contrary, it is to restore to the soul its 
egoity which supports no generalization” (Otherwise than Being 127). The 
term “subject” when thought of as a substitution for the other undergoes a 
transformation that divorces it from any appeal to universality and restores 
singularity and unicity to the subject itself; “I am not another but me” 
(127). On this score, Levinas finds praise for “Modern antihumanism” 
because it has “abandoned the idea of person,” which clears the way for 
“subjectivity positing itself in abnegation, in sacrifice, in a substitution 
which precedes the will” (127). My substitution for the other is prior to my 
constitution as a self-identical ego and is non-transferable; it is only “I” in 
my very unicity, who can take on the role of hostage for the other.  
 The philosophy of Hitlerism contains an undeniable truth: I am tied 
to my body. What is false in the philosophy of Hitlerism is the idea that 
this ties me to an exclusive people and a fated existence, because prior to 
this bondage of the self to the body I am bound to all the other others 
suffering and enjoying embodiment, not just those who supposedly share 
with me common blood. This is what Levinas means when he writes that 
the incarnate subject “is not a biological concept” (109). As a relational 
tie, the bond between self, body and other subjects me to change, 
alteration, transcendence. This alteration is not within my power, but it is 
within my responsibility to answer for its effects. This bond to all the 
others makes me responsible for all the others, beyond even my own direct 
influence upon them. In the time of fecundity explored in Totality and 
Infinity, it becomes apparent that this responsibility extends even beyond 





my own physical death. If the freedom I am granted through the ethical 
relation with the other is qualified by these bonds, I cannot declare myself 
to be absolutely free; this removes the subject from the plot of absolute 
freedom as it is constructed within liberal thought. Likewise, I cannot 
commit myself to a racist project without betraying my fundamental 
responsibility for the other, thereby negating the conditions of possibility 
for my own freedom. 
 In Otherwise than Being, Levinas argues that the (ersatz) freedom 
claimed by the liberal subject is predicated upon the freedom achieved 
through the transcendence of the same that occurs in the subject’s 
response to the call of the other. In answering the call of the other, I am 
pulled out of the obsessive identification with my body as my object or my 
possession (Levinas obliquely references Heidegger’s Jemeinigkeit here), 
and pulled into freedom. In other words, by calling me out, the other 
provides me with the necessary distance from what Heidegger calls 
Sorge—the care and concern for my own body, its finitude and 
mortality—so that I can think and act and give freely, without reserve. 
Levinas’ theory of freedom does what liberalism cannot; it stands in 
resistance to the philosophy of Hitlerism. Unlike the freedom offered by 
the philosophy of Hitlerism, the freedom Levinas posits in Otherwise than 
Being is not freedom from responsibility found in the anonymity of pagan 
unification in the One, but freedom as myself in substitution for the other.  
 Levinas returns to the question of pardon (which we first 
encountered in “Reflections on the Philosophy of Hitlerism” and then 
again in Totality and Infinity,) in Otherwise than Being, wherein he 
repeats the claim that pardon must be a function of a relation, and 
supplements this formulation with the assertion that the relation itself is 
fundamentally, and will remain, asymmetrical. In other words, I cannot 
ask of my neighbour what I ask of myself; “I can pardon others in their 
alterity inasmuch as they are subsumed under the concept of the ego” 
(198, note 30). In this sense, it would seem that the pardon that redeems 
can only be dealt to me in my singularity, as the irreplaceable one who is 
responsible for the other to the point of substitution for her, but I can only 
deal pardon to others in their particularity. This is Levinas’ attempt to 
place limits on my ability to command responsibility, to, in a sense, 
institute its asymmetricality in social institutions, in order to prevent the 
interpretation of the subject’s infinite responsibility for the other as 
something that I, personally, can demand of the other, or something that I 
can legislate into existence.  
 As subjectivity as a substitution for the other passes into the logos, 
it is transformed into a generalizable concept: the subject as it appears 
within the time of being. According to Levinas, justice requires 
universality, because there must be “a comparison between 
incomparables” (16) in order that society can be organized in conformity 





with the Good. In the name of justice, “I universalize myself” (126). In 
doing so, I betray the otherwise than being and revert to the pagan logic of 
the many in the One. Although we may conceive of this movement 
between the time of being and the time of being as alternation, it is 
important to remember that these times are simultaneous with one another. 
This means that the vulnerability of the subject as substitution is 
maintained in diachrony, even though once the subject “identifies itself in 
the temporality of its essence” (49) it finds shelter from exposure within 
self-identity. Because time is doubled, the subject can be both vulnerable 
and sheltered at the same time, in different and divergent times. So 
Levinas’ temporalized description of the entry into the logos and the entry 
of the third who demands justice, is, in fact, misleading. This means that 
these two modes of subjectivity cannot be separated.  
 In his attunement to the experience of our bodies, Levinas was able 
to perceive the diachrony of existence that allows for the simultaneous 
existence of being and the otherwise than being. By doing so, he was able 
to uncover an originating freedom that both animates and opposes the 
spirit of liberalism. But by remaining loyal to this diachrony, Levinas’ 
philosophy seems to be limited to a descriptive task. Certainly, Levinas 
prioritizes subjectivity as substitution and sensibility as the ethical 
foundation of all manifestations of subjectivity, but there is little sense, in 
Levinas’ philosophy itself, that we could mobilize the critical insights 
concerning the European notion of man that Levinas presents in 
“Reflections on the Philosophy of Hitlerism” as a social or political 
program. It would seem that, if my claim that this conception of humanity 
as embroiled within the pagan logic of the many in the One is, in fact, the 
motivation for Levinas’ philosophical project as a whole, then Levinas 
himself did not fully succeed in this project. It falls to his readers, those 
who recognize the radical nature of the subject he presents, to find the 
resources in his philosophy and, perhaps, in the work of others (see 
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